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The role of EBA in the political economy of CAP reform 
 





This paper explores whether the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, under 
which exports from 50 least developed countries (LDCs) are admitted duty-free to the 
EU market, influenced the trajectory or pace of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform. It finds no evidence that it played a role except in the case of two products, 
sugar and rice. The overall volume of exports, or potential exports, from LDCs in 
CAP products is just too small to create market management difficulties outside of 
these two products. It could play an indirect role in reform in the future in the context 
of the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations between the EU and African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Cotonou Agreement. ACP countries 
could use EBA as a benchmark and demand equivalent treatment for their exports in 
these negotiations in return for liberalising their markets towards EU exports. Any 
move to extend more generous preferential access to non-LDC ACP countries for 
CAP-supported products would have much greater implications for the CAP simply 
because of their greater supply capacity. 
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Introduction 
 
The motivation for the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative was to enhance the role 
of trade preferences as an EU development cooperation policy instrument from the 
point of view of the least developed countries (LDCs). The Commission’s view was 
that there was a real risk that these countries were becoming increasingly 
marginalised in the world economy. Apart from this altruistic motive, the initiative 
was intended to present the EU as a champion of development in the ongoing efforts 
at the time to launch a new multilateral trade round.  
 
The EU’s GSP scheme had provided for more favourable tariff treatment for LDCs. 
At the Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996, WTO Members pledged to 
carry out an action plan to improve access to their markets for products originating in 
the LDCs. In 1997, the EC Council called for the Singapore conclusions to be 
implemented by granting LDCs not party to the Lomé Convention preferences 
equivalent to those enjoyed by signatories and, in the medium term, duty-free access 
for essentially all their exports.  Council Regulation (EC) No 602/98 granted LDCs 
not party to the Lomé Convention preferences equivalent to those enjoyed by the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) signatories to the Convention. The Cotonou 
Agreement (Article 37) stated that the Community would start a process which, by the 
end of the multilateral trade negotiations and at the latest 2005, would allow duty-free 
access for essentially all products from all LDCs building on the level of the existing 
trade provisions of the Fourth ACP-EC Convention and which would simplify and 
review the rules of origin, including cumulation provisions, that apply to their exports.  
 
In September 2000, the Commission issued a press statement proposing to go beyond 
previous Community commitments by granting unrestricted duty-free access to all 
products (except arms) from all LDCs. Page and Hewitt (2002) somewhat critically 
describe the context for this decision. In February 2001, the Council adopted the so-
called "EBA Regulation” (Regulation (EC) 416/2001). The provisions of this 
Regulation were subsequently incorporated into the GSP Regulation (EC) No 
2501/2001. The EBA Regulation foresees that the special arrangements for LDCs 
should be maintained for an unlimited period of time and not be subject to the 
periodic renewal of the Community's scheme of generalised preferences. Therefore, 
the date of expiry of Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 does not apply to its 
EBA provisions. 
 
The significance of the EBA Regulation was to extend deep trade preferences to 
LDCs on products excluded from the EU’s other preferential schemes, such as 
Cotonou and the GSP. A total of 919 tariff lines (out of the 10,500 tariff lines in total) 
were affected, almost entirely agricultural products covered by the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Only imports of fresh bananas, rice and sugar were not 
fully liberalised immediately. Duties on those products are being gradually reduced 
and duty free access was granted for bananas in January 2006 and will be granted for 
sugar in July 2009 and for rice in September 2009. The extent to which this delayed 
liberalisation for these three products was due to concern over the impact on EU 
producers and the CAP will be considered later in this paper. However, the pressure to 
delay full liberalisation for these products came at least as much from other 
developing countries whose preferential access to the EU market would be eroded by 
the EBA initiative. For example, the ACP countries welcomed “the fact that the full  3
liberalisation of sugar, rice and bananas, which constitute very important export 
products for many of the LDCs, will not be implemented until 2009, thereby taking 
into account the legitimate concerns of ACP commodity-producing countries” (ACP-
EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 2001). 
 
It was recognised from the outset that the greater access under EBA would have 
implications for future reform of the CAP. Indeed, those with a Machiavellian cast of 
mind might argue that it was a deliberate attempt by one arm of the Commission (DG 
TRADE) to force change in another EU policy area (DG AGRI) particularly with 
respect to the EU sugar regime. Regulation 416/2001 noted that “In the light of the 
fact that the arrangements for the common organisation of the markets in sugar, rice 
and bananas are currently being revised or are due to be revised, the Regulations 
regarding these reforms will have to take account of duty-free access for the LDCs 
from the outset when they establish new general import arrangements”. The ACP-EU 
Joint Parliamentary Assembly statement expressed its concern that “[the EBA 
initiative] is aimed at eventually securing liberalisation of trade in all agricultural 
products at low prices and that, if it is not improved, it could rob the trade protocols 
attached to the Cotonou Agreement of their substance” (op. cit.) 
 
The first objective of this paper is to explore whether, in practice, the EBA has 
influenced the trajectory and pace of CAP reform either in general or with respect to 
the specific commodity regimes identified as sensitive in the Regulation. The paper 
finds evidence that the EBA impact was indeed important in the reform of the EU 
sugar and rice regimes but that, apart from these two products, the EBA was not 
otherwise a factor taken into account in the most recent 2003 CAP reform process. 
The paper reviews ex ante projections of the likely impact of EBA access for 
agricultural markets, and compares these with ex post evidence on the actual increase 
in trade to date, recalling that barriers for bananas were only eliminated on 1 January 
2006 and barriers remain on sugar and rice until 2009. While some ex ante forecasts 
warned of the need to take account of the EBA factor in considering CAP reform, 
there is little evidence from the ex post trade statistics of any export surge which 
might cause complications except, again, in the case of sugar. 
  
While evidence that the EBA has had a direct impact on CAP reform is limited, there 
may be indirect effects of the EBA initiative which may turn out to be important in 
the longer term. One such indirect effect is that the EBA increased the number of 
WTO members which have preferential market access to the EU market and thus, by 
implication, a stake in the continuation of a high-price EU agricultural policy. In this 
way, the EU may have hoped to diminish the pressure from developing countries for 
more radical CAP reform. Also, by making the demand that other developed countries 
should also introduce EBA market access terms for LDCs, the EU put pressure on its 
negotiating partners to liberalise their agricultural policies, to the extent that 
additional LDC exports to these countries might force faster reform of these policies 
than might otherwise have been the case. Neither argument appears to hold much 
water on closer examination. 
 
A second indirect effect might be called the demonstration effect of the EBA in the 
context of the EU’s negotiations with ACP countries on a successor to the trade 
provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. The EU has proposed forming reciprocal free 
trade areas called Economic Partnership Arrangements with a number of ACP  4
regions. ACP countries are being asked to offer duty-free access to most EU products 
(albeit over a transition period) and will be seeking improved market access in return. 
Their obvious benchmark is EBA-equivalent status, and this demand will be further 
encouraged by the fact that each of the six ACP negotiating regions has at least one 
LDC member. Extending EBA-equivalent access to ACP non-LDCs would offer a 
group of countries with vastly greater (if still limited) supply capacity unrestricted 
access to CAP-protected markets. The consequences for the CAP would then be very 
different to those outlined below. 
 
Ex ante EBA impact on CAP reform  
 
The reform impact of EBA depends on the volume of additional imports expected 
from LDCs and the way these additional imports influence the EU market balance and 
interact with the market support instruments of the CAP. Two widely different 
assessments were offered in the negotiating phase of the EBA in studies undertaken 
for Oxfam by Stevens and Kennan (2001) and by DG Agri (2000). Stevens and 
Kennan argued that the EBA would affect LDC trade only for products on which they 
currently paid an import tax in the EU and where they had a supply capacity. Sifting 
through 1997 EU trade statistics, they identified 2,939 items imported from at least 
one LDC, but for only 502 of these was the export value from the whole LDC group 
more than $500,000. Of these, only 11 at that time did not have duty and quota-free 
access, and these were the items for which the EBA would make an immediate 
difference (Table 1). 
 
They then asked what would happen to EU imports if the LDCs could divert to the 
EU their entire global exports. Table 2 shows, for each broad product group and using 
statistics from FAOSTAT, the value of LDC global exports in 1997 as a proportion of 
total EU imports from all sources of the products that might be affected by EBA. 
They argued that the picture painted for most products is of the LDCs as marginal 
suppliers. For four of the ten products (as both types of rice are included in the FAO 
‘rice’ group),  LDC global exports are less than 1% of EU global imports, and for a 
further four they are less than 10% (this includes raw sugar). They concluded that 
only in the cases of beef and veal and refined sugar (and the latter is not a heavily 
traded commodity) is it plausible to suppose that LDCs could have a significant 
absolute impact on EU markets. 
 
An initial assessment from officials in DG Agri provided a very different assessment. 
The DG Agri paper began by recognising that the LDCs together have very small net 
exports which they could export to the EU. Even when account is taken of greater 
export surpluses of individual LDCs, it admits these appeared to be quite limited and 
would probably not cause major problems as far as the most sensitive products are 
concerned. Its more apocalyptic tone was due to three factors. First, it argued that 
LDCs would be likely to import agricultural products to meet their domestic 
consumption needs and export part of their own domestic production to the EU. It 
acknowledged that this type of triangular trade (import/export swap) would be 
completely legal and pointed to existing evidence of it happening in the sugar sector. 
Second, it argued that the proposed EBA would apply current GSP rules of origin 
which allowed regional cumulation for origin purposes between LDCs and two  5
regional groupings, ASEAN and SAARC,
2 as well as the EU. Regional cumulation 
would allow LDCs to export as their own goods products which had been imported 
from one of these regions and processed adding at least 100% to the import value.
3 
Third, it pointed to the possibilities of bilateral cumulation between the EU and LDCs 
with more limited value added if a processing company operated both in the EU and 
in an LDC. It could export from the EU using export subsidies and then re-export 
from the LDC to the EU at the domestic market price (“carousel” arrangement). 
 
In its empirical estimates, the DG Agri paper focused on the likelihood of swap trade. 
It developed a ‘ready reckoner’ examining the impact of LDCs exporting 10% of their 
total production to the EU over time. On this basis (and excluding the sensitive 
products of rice, sugar and bananas which were discussed in greater detail and which 
arguments are reviewed later), it projected this could result in an additional 4.5 
million tones of cereals (excluding rice), around 1.5 million tones of vegetables and 
slightly less than 1 million tones of fruit. In addition, it projected increased exports of 
22,000 tonnes of skimmed milk powder, a similar amount of beef and more than 
100,000 tonnes of sheepmeat.  
 
Table 1. LDCs’ exports to the EU that will be affected by EBA, 1997 
Current import restrictions (1999
 a)
  CN_1997 Description 
non-ACP LLDCs  ACP LLDCs 
02023090  frozen bovine boned meat   9.8%+€332.6/100kg   0%+€332.6/100kg; 
Protocol K0%+€28.8/100kg 
04069021  cheddar (excl. grated or powdered and for processing)  No preference  K€63.9/100kg 
07099060  fresh or chilled sweetcorn No  preference  €10.1/100kg 
08030019  bananas, fresh (excl. plantains)  No preference  €508/1000kg (K0) 
10059000  maize (excl. seed)  No preference  €75.19/T
 b 
10062017  long grain husked –brown- rice, length/width ratio >=3, 
parboiled 
Bangladesh K€109.82/1000kg;  
no preference 
P€75.57/1000kg 
10063098  wholly milled long grain rice, length/width ratio >= 3, 
(excl. parboiled) 
Bangladesh K€232.09/1000kg;  
no preference 
P€160.51/1000kg 
17011110  raw cane sugar, for refining (excl. added flavouring or 
colouring) 
No preference  K0; 
Protocol 0 
17011190  raw cane sugar (excl. for refining and added flavouring 
or colouring) 
No preference  K0; 
Protocol 0 
17019910  white sugar, containing in dry state>= 99.5 % sucrose 
(excl. flavoured or coloured) 
No preference  K0; 
Protocol 0 (for 1 item out of 2) 
17031000  cane molasses resulting from the extraction or refining 
of sugar 
No preference  K0 
Note: 
(a)  ‘K’ denotes rate within quota; ‘P’ denotes ceiling. 
Sources: Eurostat 1998; Taric 1999. 
Source:  Stevens and Kennan, 2001 
 
                                                 
2 ASEAN countries comprise Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, 
Philippines. SAARC countries comprise Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, 
Bhutan.  
3  This appears to be based on a misunderstanding of GSP rules of origin.  Regional cumulation within 
the meaning of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 applies where a product used in further 
manufacture in a country belonging to a regional group originates in another country of the group, 
which does not benefit from the arrangements applying to the final product, provided that both 
countries benefit from regional cumulation for that group.   6
Table 2. LDC global exports in relation to EU global imports, 1997. 
FAO product group  HS codes
 a  LLDC global exports as a proportion 
of EU imports from Extra-EU, 1997 
Beef and veal  020110/20, 020210/20*
   15.7% 
Beef and veal, boneless  020130, 020230*
   0.4% 
Cheese (whole cow milk)  0406*  0.02% 
Green corn (maize)
 b  070990*  no LLDC exports 
Bananas 0803*  0.7% 
Maize 1005  5.9% 
Rice 100610/20/30/40  5.3% 
Sugar (centrifugal, raw)  170111/12*  7.4% 
Sugar refined  170191/99  44.0% 
Molasses 1703  2.9% 
Note: 
(a)  The HS codes included in the FAO product group, according to FAO’s concordance. An asterisk denotes that the HS 
codes shown (and used to obtain the EU import data on which the percentages in the next column are based) are broader 
in coverage than the FAO product group. 
(b)  The HS code listed in FAO’s concordance indicates that this is sweetcorn. 
Sources: Eurostat 1998; FAO 1998. 
Source:  Stevens and Kennan, 2001 
 
It went on to consider the probability of these trade flows emerging, pointing out the 
difficulties LDCs would have in the short term in meeting SPS standards in fruits and 
vegetables and animal products. It also recognized that the price gap for wheat 
between EU and world market prices would make it unlikely that LDCs would find it 
worthwhile to engage in swap trade, although the incentive would be higher for 
maize. It was also possible that additional LDC exports would displace third country 
exports (trade diversion) rather than EU domestic production. However, even though 
it was unlikely there would be major problems in the short term, the paper warned that 
LDCs could progressively generate market problems for the EU. It hinted that these 
competition problems might have to be taken into account in discussions on reform of 
EU commodity regimes. 
 
However, again apart from the three sensitive commodities which are considered in 
more detail below, there is no evidence that EBA concerns have driven subsequent 
CAP reform.  In the 1990s, there were two major reforms of the CAP. The MacSharry 
reform in 1992 for the first time made a switch from market support to direct support 
for farmers’ incomes, the latter linked to production limitations. In 1999, the Agenda 
2000 agreement intensified the 1992 reforms. As a result, the EU’s market price 
support, the most trade-distorting form of support, which accounted for 85% of total 
support in the 1980s, fell to 50% before the June 2003 reform (OECD, 2005). Export 
subsidies fell from 25% of the value of farm exports in 1992 to 5.2% in 2001 and in 
absolute terms from €10 billion to €2.8 billion a year.   
 
The changes in the form of support agreed as part of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of 
Agenda 2000 in Luxembourg in June 2003 marked a further significant step in the 
reform process. The main innovation of the 2003 reform concerned the design of the 
EU direct payment schemes with a move from coupled to decoupled payments. As a 
result of those changes, and the subsequent reform of the tobacco, cotton, olive oil and 
hops regimes, it is estimated that up to 90 % of EU direct payments will be eligible 
for the minimally distorting or non-distorting Green Box category. It is noteworthy 
that only in connection with rice is the EBA mentioned as a possible factor in reform 
in any of the Commission documentation setting out its justification and rationale 
(Commission 2002, Commission 2003, DG Agri 2003).  7
 
Ex post EBA impact on CAP reform 
 
While we find no evidence that concerns about EBA competition played a role in the 
June 2003 CAP reform (again excepting the sensitive products), it is possible the 
competition effect has been underestimated and that actual trade flows are larger than 
expected. The relative importance of EBA preferential imports in 2002 compared to 
other sources of EU agri-food imports is shown in Table 3. In total, they amount to 
0.44% of the EU total, although of course for individual commodities their 
importance could be greater.  
 
Table 3.  EU imports of agro-food products under various regimes, year 2002 




Share in total 
imports 
Preferential imports from developing
countries 
 13  316  20.01% 
  Non reciprocal preferences  0   
    Cotonou  Africa, Caribbean, Pacific  5 500  8.26% 
  GSP  (excluding  Eastern  Europe)  Almost all developing countries  4 257  6.40% 
    GSP "plus" (drugs)   Countries fighting drug trafficking  1 714  2.58% 
    Everything But Arms   Least developed (except Myanmar)  294  0.44% 
  Others  Overseas  territories.  399  0.60% 
  Reciprocal preferences        
    Bilateral agreements with developing
countries 
Maghreb, Mashrek, etc.  1 153  1.73% 
Imports under a zero MFN duty from
developing countries 
All developing countries  15 567  23.39% 
Imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries 11  724  17.61% 










Source: Data from Gallezot, based on Taxud and TARIC-Eurostat. Figures for 2002, Chapters 1 to 24 of the 
Harmonized System. GSP indicates the Generalised system of preferences. MFN stands for Most Favoured Nation. 
 
While the absolute amount of EBA preferential imports is small, for these agricultural 
products benefiting from an additional preferential advantage due to the EBA 
(referred to here as EBA products), there has been a doubling in the volume of exports 
to the EU during the implementation phase of the initiative (Table 4). The trend is 
more striking when compared to the exports of EBA products from other (non LDC) 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Between 1996 and 2000, the exports of non 
LDC African countries to the EU decreased at a rate relatively close to that of the fall 
in LDC exports (a fall of 19% for exports of EBA products from non-LDC ACP 
countries, a fall of 16% for LDC exports). On the other hand, after 2000 the growth of 
LDC exports to the EU contrasts with those of other ACP countries: exports of EBA 
products from African LDCs doubled and those of Asian LDCs tripled, while those of 






Table 4. LDC agricultural exports, 2000 and 2003 
 
   2000 2003 
LDC Exports  Agricultural Products  Agricultural Products 
to  EBA Total  EBA/Total  EBA  Total EBA/Total 
   1000$ 1000$  %  1000$  1000$  % 
EU  80,664 1,450,846 5,6  166,147 1,506,725 11,0 
Other  494,420 2,562,593 19,3  688,200 5,038,847 13,7 
                
Total  575085 4013439 14,3  688200 5038847 13,7 
Agriculture have defined by the WTO 
Sources: BACI (Cepii) and TARIC (DG-Taxud) 
 
 
While this seems to underline the success of the EBA in stimulating additional exports 
in the agri-food sector from LDCs, more detailed evaluation highlights that this 
growth has been concentrated on a narrow range of products and a limited number of 
countries. There were in 2003 only seven products individually representing more 
than 1% of the total exports in EBA products to the EU. This selection covers 92.5% 
of EBA exports to the EU (Table 5). By comparing 2003 with the pre-EBA initiative 
period, it can be noted that this selection criterion includes 86% of EBA exports to the 
EU in 2000 and 90.1% in 1996. It can be noted that certain products which 
represented a significant share of exports to the EU no longer appear in this selection 
in 2003. These are live poultry and bovine meat as well as bananas. On the other 
hand, exports of cane sugar multiplied three-fold between 2000 and 2003. LDCs, 
which sent a third of their sugar exports to the EU in 1996, sent two thirds of the total 
in 2003. 
 
Table 5. Exports of products benefiting from an EBA preferential advantage, 




The LDCs that represent more than 1% of the value of exports to the EU in products 
benefiting from an advantage with the EBA initiative are, compared to the previous 
periods, more numerous in 2003 (Table 6). There were, in 2003, 14 countries (out of 
48) that cover 95.8% of exports to the EU for these products. These are mainly 
African countries, at the head of which we find Malawi (25.1% of the value of exports 
to the EU), Zambia (16.5%) and Sudan (11.6%). For these three countries, the value  9
of exports to the EU has risen sharply since the EBA was implemented (it tripled for 
Malawi and Zambia). These are the countries for which the additional sugar quota has 
been particularly important. We conclude from this detailed examination of actual 
trade flows by country and commodity that there is no ex post evidence to suggest that 
EBA imports have grown by amounts which are likely to cause CAP market 
imbalances.  
 
A further feature of LDC trade in agri-food products with the EU is that only a small 
proportion of it is actually conducted under the terms of the EBA, with exporting 
countries appearing to prefer apparently less advantageous preference schemes such 
as Cotonou.  For non-agricultural products (mainly textiles and clothing), stricter rules 
of origin seem to be an important determinant of this preference. For agri-food 
products, the situation in 2003 is set out in Table 7. Even for EBA products, i.e. 
products for which the EBA actually provided some extra tariff advantages compared 
to the previous situation, around 23% of agri-food products enter under the MFN 
regime. A further 56% enter under the Cotonou Agreement, even though the EBA 
provides duty free access (and not Cotonou). Possible explanations for this behaviour, 
based on interviews with importers, appear to be the small size of the Cotonou/EBA 
preference margin differential which gives little incentive to use the EBA as well as 
an entrenched use of ACP administrative forms (OECD, 2005). As a result, the 
overall importance of the EBA as a scheme for the import of agri-food products into 
the EU remains very small. 
 








Table 7. The EBA utilization rate for agricultural products and for products 
where the initiative introduced a real preferential advantage. 
 
 




Three sensitive products where liberalisation is being phased in over a transitional 
period were identified in the EBA Regulation: sugar, rice and bananas. The 
competitive threat was recognised, and for these products we are more likely to see 
evidence of a knock on effect on CAP reform. The significance of sugar from the 
perspective of this paper is that not only is there clear evidence that concern about 
additional EBA imports played a role in shaping the Commission’s reform proposal, 
but the LDC EBA beneficiaries themselves have forcefully engaged in attempting to 
influence the trajectory of reform, to the extent that they proposed foregoing the main 
advantage of EBA – duty-free and quota-free access – for a limited transitional period 
in return for a less drastic reform package (Brüntrup, 2005). This has created an 
unusual alliance between sugar producers in the EU and a cohort of the world’s 
poorest countries. Brüntrup argues that the Commission skilfully used the threat of 
open-ended LDC imports to push through its favoured reform strategy based on price 
reductions – what he calls the ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy - rather than compromise on the 
quota-reduction strategy favoured by EU and ACP producers. 
 
The LDCs as a whole are net importers of sugar. Their consumption amounts to about 
3.4 million tonnes and production to about 2.6 million tonnes of raw sugar, leaving 
them with a net deficit of about 0.7 million tonnes. Thus, production is insufficient to 
meet domestic demand (LMC, 2004). Only a few countries are net exporters. 
Although there are 50 countries which fall under the EBA, sugar exports are 
dominated by a handful of countries. However, the EBA arrangement does not require 
beneficiary countries to be net exporters, only that sugar exported to the EU must be 
domestically produced to meet the rules of origin. EBA countries have a big incentive 
to export their domestic production at the high EU price and re-import their domestic 
needs from the world market. Thus, once quotas are removed in 2009, the pattern of 
exporting countries could change, depending on the sugar price prevailing in the EU 
market at that time.  
 
The key issue with regard to EBA is that, prior to reform, the reference price for EU 
sugar was 2-3 times the world price. The likely effect of this on full implementation 
of the EBA in 2009 was that the EU would act as a ‘suction pump’ for sugar 
production in EBA countries, fuelling growth in the industry which would further 
increase the volumes of sugar entering the EU through the agreement (EC, 2003). 
Various estimates of the possible volumes involved have been made. Stevens and  11
Kennan (2001) provided a lower bound estimate based on the difference (in 1997) 
between global LDC exports and exports to the EU in that year of 100,000 tonnes. 
The initial Commission estimate suggested that 2.7 million tonnes could be imported, 
of which 1.3 million would arise from increases in LDC production (DG Agriculture, 
2000). This was subsequently revised down to 900,000 tonnes after account was taken 
of infrastructure costs and constraints to expansion faced by countries which are land-
locked, politically unstable or face other such problems (DG Agriculture, 2001). 
Other authors give estimates of 2.4 million tonnes (Mitchell, 2004) and between 0.5 
and 3.9 million tonnes (LMC, 2004). A more recent estimate which takes account of 
the post-reform prices and includes possible swap-trade has suggested a maximum 
level of imports of 2.2 million tonnes (EC, 2005). The wide variation in these 
estimates partly relates to different assumptions about the likely price on the EU 
market in the future as well as the proportion of domestic sugar production which 
might be exported to the EU.  
 
The background to the EU sugar reform is explained in Chaplin and Matthews (2005).  
Now that the reform is agreed, the question arises whether it is sufficient and 
sustainable in the light of EBA access. The July 2004 reform proposal by the 
Commission was projected to decrease EU-25 production from 19.7 million tonnes to 
12.2 million tonnes by 2012/13. Total preferential imports were expected to amount to 
3.9 million tonnes after full implementation of EBA (EC, 2005).  This included a 
projected figure of 2.2 million tonnes for EBA imports and 1.3 million tonnes for 
ACP/India. The Commission’s projected fall in EU production of 7.5 million tonnes 
would be sufficient for the EU to comply with the WTO ruling, to eventually remove 
export subsidies and to absorb EBA imports with scope to absorb an additional 0.4 
million tonnes above the projected level (EC, 2005a).  The sugar reform agreement in 
November 2005 was less ambitious than the July 2004 proposal. Also, some analysts 
believe that the EU supply response to a fall in the sugar price will be much lower 
than what the EU Commission has projected. For example, Gohin and Bureau (2006) 
expect the reform to reduce EU production by only 2.7 million tonnes, enough to cope 
with the WTO panel report but not with the elimination of export subsidies or the 
growth in EBA imports.  
 
On the other hand, there is considerable uncertainty about the likely volumes of EBA 
imports after 2009. These will depend on the EU price relative to the world price and 
the ability of the EU to monitor the origin of sugar imported under the EBA.  Some 
expert opinion suggests that the EBA export increases projected by the Commission 
are unlikely to materialise given that the reform has reduced the profitability of 
supplying the EU market. Stevens (2006) quotes one industry view which suggests 
that, if non-LDC ACP countries continue to be constrained by the Sugar Protocol 
export quantities, the net additional impact of EBA given the reform is likely to be 
less than 100,000 tonnes. Even if non-LDC ACP countries were given EBA-like 
unlimited access to the EU market at the new reference price, the additional volume of 
imports from ACP countries under all preferential regimes would be just over 1 
million tonnes, according to this source. If these lower figures turn out to be more 
realistic, then the EBA is unlikely to be a factor threatening the sustainability of the 
reformed EU sugar regime.  However, a particular problem could arise after 2009 
when the EBA quotas disappear and with them the ability of the EU to insist that the 
refiners pay a minimum price for EBA sugar. The EU would have an obligation to 
pay the EU reference price for ACP sugar purchased under the Protocol. But if the EU  12
sugar refineries were no longer interested in buying ACP sugar because EBA sugar 
was available at less than the reference price, this could require the EU to directly 




Rice was one of the few products where specific Common Market Organisation 
changes were introduced in the June 2003 Luxembourg Council decision. At that 
time, EU rice production benefited from an intervention price of 298.35 €/t (paddy 
rice). In addition, producers received a direct payment of 52.65 €/t multiplied by the 
reference yield and paid per hectare, within Maximum Guaranteed Areas (MGA). The 
intervention price equated to roughly twice the world market price for rice. As for 
sugar, the fear was that LDCs might export, in line with the rules of origin, the totality 
of their domestic rice production to the EU, while importing their domestic 
consumption requirements from the world market. Another fear was that the LDCs 
might import raw rice, process it and then export it back to the EU, adding sufficient 
value so as to meet the rules of origin requirements.  
 
The Commission’s original proposal in June 2002 proposal was designed to address 
these fears by decreasing the rice intervention price to world market levels while 
compensating producers with increased direct aid.  Its proposal noted that “In the rice 
sector, the market situation is characterised by considerable public intervention stocks 
of around a quarter of annual production. A further deterioration of the market 
imbalance can be expected from the implementation of the Everything but Arms 
Initiative. By 2009/10, total public rice stocks in the EU are expected to reach an 
unsustainable level.” 
 
The Commission proposed a one step reduction of the intervention price by 50% to a 
basic price of 150 €/t for 2004/05 in line with world prices. It also proposed a private 
storage scheme which would be triggered when the market price fell below the basic 
price. Safety net intervention would be established at 120 €/t. The global price 
reduction would be compensated at a rate of 88%, equivalent to the total cereals 
compensation over the 1992 and Agenda 2000 reforms. This implied compensation of 
177 €/t, including the existing payment of 52 €/t. Of this, 102 €/t multiplied by the 
1995 reform yield would become an income payment paid per farm. The remaining 
75 €/t multiplied by the 1995 reform yield would be paid as a crop specific aid 
reflecting the role of rice production in traditional production areas. The maximum 
guaranteed areas (MGA) would be reduced to the 1999-2001 average or the current 
MGA, whichever was lower. 
 
The final Council compromise was close to the Commission proposal. It involved a 
50% cut in the intervention price to 150 €/t, triggering intervention limited to a 
maximum quantity of 75,000t per annum. Compensation payments were set at a level 
of 177 €/t of which 75 €/t was granted as a crop-specific payment. The national 
MGAs were reduced to the lower of the 1999-2001 average or the current MGA. 
Finally, the Commission was mandated to negotiate tariff quotas for rice imports 
availing of the WTO procedures for this purpose. 
 
The logic of the reform was spelled out in one of the impact studies undertaken by the 
Commission (Commission, 2003). Reducing the support price for rice by around 50%  13
was projected to translate into a very sharp fall in EU domestic prices towards world 
market levels, which would boost EU rice competitiveness while reducing the 
attractiveness of the EU market as an export market. The fall in prices is accompanied 
by the granting of direct payments, which partly maintain the production potential of 
the EU rice sector. In contrast, the fall in market prices would encourage rice 
consumption, which would increase strongly relative to status quo levels. Whereas 
total imports were projected to represent some 30% of total EU consumption by 
2008/09 before rising to 80% under a status quo policy, the substantial drop in the 
internal market price would enable the EU market to lessen its dependency on 
imported rice. The EU market would be less attractive as an import market, since 
domestic prices would develop at world market levels. As for sugar, a clear link can 
also be made in the case of rice between the reform that took place and concern about 




Bananas was the third of the sensitive products but LDC access has now been totally 
liberalised since 1 January 2006. The EU’s import regime for bananas has been 
significantly changed, first in response to the introduction of the EU single market in 
1993 and more recently in 2006 in response to a series of challenges in the WTO.
4 
Prior to 1993, in the absence of a common EU policy on the import of bananas, 
several member states had their own import controls. The 1993 regime designed to 
replace these various national arrangements was a very complex one, based on a 
system of quotas differentiated by source, category and by group of economic 
activity. One quota was reserved for traditional ACP suppliers which could export 
duty-free within this quota. A second quota was reserved for MFN suppliers 
(principally Latin American exporters) which paid a duty of €100/t on bananas 
exported within their quota. Out-of-quota imports were subject to effectively 
prohibitive tariffs of €850/t (€750/t for ACP suppliers) reducing to €680/t at the end 
of the Uruguay Round implementation period. Following a second successful GATT 
challenge to this regime, the EU entered into a Banana Framework Agreement with 
most of the Latin American exporters which provided a higher tariff quota and a 
lower tariff under this quota. This regime was again challenged in 1996 and again the 
complaint against the EU was largely upheld. After years of prevarication within the 
WTO, the EU and US reached an agreement in 2001 to resolve the dispute. This 
agreement committed the EU to a series of phased implementation steps, ending with 
the introduction of a tariff-only regime for banana imports by 1 January 2006. This 
agreement was underpinned by two waivers granted at the November 2001 WTO 
Ministerial Conference at Doha in which it was stated that the tariff-only regime 
‘would result in at least maintaining total market access for MFN banana suppliers’.  
 
In January 2005 the EU proposed a €230/t tariff to be imposed on bananas imported 
from MFN countries under this tariff-only regime. Latin American exporters deemed 
this to be too high and called for arbitration. The arbitrators ruled that the regime did 
not satisfy the WTO waiver requirement. In September 2005 the EU submitted a 
revised proposal with a significantly lower tariff of €187/t together with a duty-free 
quota for ACP exporters. This was also deemed unacceptable by the arbitrators. 
                                                 
4 The tortuous history of the GATT and WTO banana disputes is recounted in Weiss (2003) and Vranes 
(2003).   14
Subsequently, the EU decided unilaterally to adopt a tariff-only regime from 1 
January 2006 which implements a €176/t MFN tariff and a duty-free quota for ACP 
exporters. Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama have indicated that they will challenge 
the new tariff-only regime so the ‘banana war’ will continue (see Anania, 2006 for 
details).  
 
The EU’s stubbornness in resisting these international pressures for reform of its 
banana import regime is rooted in its commitment in the Banana Protocol to the Lomé 
IV Convention which required it not to place any ACP state as regards access to its 
traditional markets in the EU in a less favourable situation than in the past or the 
present. When the EBA was introduced, EU consumption was estimated at around 
3.934 million tonnes of which 854,000t were EU production, 2,420,000t were imports 
at €75/t duty and 660,000t were ACP imports at zero duty (DG Agri, 2000). The very 
substantial gap between the internal EU price and the world market price (€660/t as 
compared to €360/t in 1999-2000, according to the same source) created a potential 
incentive for LDCs to redirect banana production and increase exports to the EU 
market, disturbing the delicate balance created by the import regime. In practice, 
however, this potential threat to the regime from increased LDC imports was never 
considered a serious one. Although total banana production in LDCs amounted to 
around 5.7m tonnes and thus exceeded EU consumption by almost 2 million tonnes, 
most LDCs do not produce exportable bananas. Total LDC exports at that time only 
amounted to 26,000t, all of which came from ACP LDCs within the ACP quota (Cape 
Verde, Madagascar and Somalia) which was not filled in any event.  
 
A recent modelling exercise, one of the few which tries to take explicit account of 
EBA, confirms this view (Anania, 2006). The model is calibrated to 2002, in which 
year net exports from EBA countries of 50,000t were assumed. With the 
implementation of EBA and the continuation of the pre-2006 regime, EBA exports to 
the EU (including from ACP LDCs) are projected to grow to 133,000t (a figure for 
total exports is not given in the paper). However, this figure is based on generic export 
supply elasticities as well as some ad hoc modification to the underlying trends in 
population and per capita income which otherwise would have led to decreased or no 
exports from EBA countries. Thus, it really should be seen as an indicative figure 
rather than a forecast. Despite the fact that the ending of the transition period for EBA 
bananas and the introduction of the tariff-only regime were timed to coincide on 1 
January 2006, there seems little evidence of any other link between the two events. 
The EU authorities seem to have been satisfied that EBA bananas were not in 
principle different from ACP bananas and that any growth in these exports was not 
likely to add to supply on the EU market beyond what was factored in from ACP 
countries. Unlike in the case of sugar and rice, therefore, there is no evidence that 
concern about the impact of EBA imports was a factor in reform of the EU’s banana 
regime. 
 
The role of the EBA in WTO negotiations 
 
The CAP has been heavily criticised both by developing countries and by 
development NGOs within Europe for damaging the growth and trade prospects of 
poor countries and for being incoherent with the EU’s development policy objectives. 
In response to these criticisms, the Council of Agricultural Ministers has argued that 
the EU has developed its agricultural trade policy so as to provide preferential access  15
to developing country exporters under a variety of schemes (DG Agri, 2002). 
Following an informal meeting in Killarney, Ireland in May 2004, the Agricultural 
Council highlighted the ways in which the EU has tried to communicate its food 
safety regulations and provide technical assistance to help developing countries meet 
these standards as further evidence of its commitment to facilitating food and 
agriculture trade (Commission, 2004).  
 
In this context, the EBA may have a significance beyond its immediate trade effects 
by improving the ‘development credibility’ of the CAP. The EU may have hoped to 
co-opt the support of the least developed countries (of whom 32 of the 50 are now 
WTO members, out of a total membership of 150 by the time of Hong Kong 
Ministerial at the end of 2005) for its cautious approach to further agricultural trade 
liberalisation. These countries now have a stake in the continuation of EU protection, 
particularly for agricultural products, as further liberalisation leads to an erosion of the 
value of their preferences. Also, having committed to full access for LDCs, the EU 
could make the extension of duty-free and quota-free access (DFQFA) by all 
developed countries, and indeed some developing countries, an offensive demand in 
the negotiations. For some of its trading partners, opening their agricultural markets 
fully to LDC imports could require changes in their domestic agricultural policies 
similar to those required for sugar and rice in the EU, quite apart from any market 
access gains the EU might hope to make through the general tariff cutting 
negotiations. It is thus not surprising that the EU has been the main champion of this 
demand in the Doha Round negotiations.
5 
 
The Doha Declaration, in paragraph 42, commits WTO members “to the objective of 
duty-free, quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs.  In this 
regard, we welcome the significant market access improvements by WTO Members 
in advance of the Third UN Conference on LDCs (LDC-III), in Brussels, May 2001.  
We further commit ourselves to consider additional measures for progressive 
improvements in market access for LDCs.” In fact, many other developed countries, 
and some developing countries, have already taken steps to implement this 
commitment. New Zealand and Australia offer DFQFA since 2001 and 2003 
respectively.  Japan announced its “99%-initiative on Industrial Tariffs” in 2001, 
while Canada’s LDC Market Access Initiative announced in 2003 extends DFQFA to 
all products except supply-managed agricultural products (dairy, poultry, eggs). The 
US gives enhanced market access opportunities for 25 least-developed countries of 
the 37 Sub-Saharan African beneficiaries under the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA). Among the major developing countries, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China already offer duty-free and quota-free access on virtually all products, 
including products from the least developed countries. In many, though not all, cases, 
however, agricultural products remain excluded from these arrangements. 
 
Against this background, the agreement in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
that developed country Members, and developing country Members declaring 
themselves in a position to do so, would implement duty-free and quota-free market 
                                                 
5 The Commission, in its Explanatory Memorandum when presenting the EBA proposal to the EU 
Council, noted: “It will show developing countries in general, and the LLDCs in particular, that after 
Seattle the Community is continuing to take the initiative on trade liberalisation, and will testify to its 
genuine efforts to take on board the needs and concerns expressed by these countries regarding a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations” (p. 3).   16
access for products originating from LDCs by 2008, or earlier if the implementation 
period of a new agreement begins before then, must be welcomed. There were, of 
course, qualifications. In particular, the obligation is interpreted as DFQFA for at least 
97% of LDC products defined at the tariff line level. Depending on the number of 
tariff lines with LDC exports, this will normally allow an importing country to exempt 
its principal sensitive products from DFQFA. Although the text includes a ‘best 
effort’ provision to ‘take steps to progressively achieve’ full product coverage, there is 
no deadline as to when this should be achieved. Also, while developing countries 
called for a binding commitment, the agreement refers to providing DFQFA on a 
lasting basis. The possibility of excluding sensitive products from DFQFA means that 
other developed countries can exempt sensitive agricultural products such as rice in 
Japan, sugar in the US or poultrymeat in Canada from their LDC offers. Given the 
limited supply capacity of LDCs, this suggests that this agreement will not create 
particular difficulties for the management of agricultural policy in other developed 
countries. 
 
The EU’s strong support for full DFQFA by all developed countries did not appear to 
earn it much reciprocal support in the agricultural negotiations at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial.  The EU went into the Ministerial seeking a high level of ambition in the 
final outcome, meaning that it was prepared to offer significant cuts in its agricultural 
support provided some of the more advanced developing countries made significant 
offers on industrial protection and services. However, its offer of an average farm 
tariff cut of 46 percent was criticised as too low by the US, the Cairns Group of 
agricultural exporters and the G-20, which wanted developed countries to cut tariffs 
by 54 percent while developing countries do so by 36 percent (ICSTD, 2005). 
Significantly, developing countries presented a collective show of strength during the 
meeting when all of the developing country groupings – the G-20, the ACP group, the 
LDC group, the African Union, small and vulnerable economies, the G-33 and G-90 – 
held a joint press conference to underline their "shared interest in the development 
dimension of the round and their expectations for a comprehensive development 
outcome." The joint statement by the group – referred to as the G-110 - underlined 
their objectives to seek the elimination of agricultural export subsidies by 2010; the 
need for substantial reductions in trade-distorting support; and the importance of 
substantial improvements in market access for products of export interest from 
developing countries in developed country markets
6 (add ref). Apart from 
Switzerland, the EU was alone in refusing to accept the 2010 date for the elimination 
of export subsidies, and the final declaration ultimately compromised on 2013, 
although with the proviso that a substantial part of the reduction is realised by the end 
of the first half of the implementation period. Although the EU argued that the offers 
on manufactures and services at Hong Kong were far too limited to provide the basis 
for a deal, it found itself blamed for the lack of a breakthrough in the talks by refusing 
to put a more generous agricultural offer on the table. Rather than the EBA being seen 
as a gesture of good faith and a sign of the development credentials of the EU in the 
negotiations, it appears to have been interpreted more as a fig leaf designed to 
                                                 




disguise its reluctance to make an offer which was deemed adequate particularly by 
the major developing country players in the G-20. 
 
The role of the EBA in the EPA negotiations 
 
There is a further channel whereby the introduction of EBA could lead to accelerated 
CAP reform. The EU is currently engaged in renegotiating its preferential access 
arrangements for ACP countries (only six of whom are LDCs) under the Cotonou 
Agreement.  The Cotonou Agreement is a comprehensive aid and trade agreement 
concluded between 77 ACP countries and the European Union, signed in June 2000 in 
Cotonou (Benin). The Cotonou Agreement builds on former ACP-EU cooperation 
(the Yaoundé and Lomé agreements), and includes economic and trade co-operation 
as well as aid. Under the four successive Lomé conventions (1975-2000), the EU 
granted a preferential trade regime to ACP countries through trade preferences, 
commodity protocols and other instruments of trade co-operation as well as financial 
and technical aid. Under Cotonou, the current non-reciprocal tariff preferences will be 
maintained until 31st December 2007 under the terms of a WTO waiver from its rules 
governing non-discriminatory treatment of third countries. Starting from 2008, a set of 
reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will replace them, following 
negotiations that began in September 2002.  
 
The EU operates on the assumption that the EPA negotiations will be concluded on a 
regional basis, with regions which have functioning regional integration processes and 
mechanisms. The outcome should be WTO-compatible, meaning that the ACP 
countries must open their borders to “substantially all” EU exports. Those countries 
that do not wish to open their markets to EU products after 2008 can choose to revert 
to the Generalised System of Preferences regime. Because the ACP countries include 
both LDCs and non-LDCs, some of them can benefit from EBA status while others 
cannot. 
 
There will be pressure on the EU to offer reciprocal concessions to offset the opening 
up of ACP economies to its exports. For the ACP countries, the obvious benchmark 
would be EBA status for all ACP countries. This would extend duty-free and quota-
free access to countries with substantially greater supply capacity than the LDCs 
enjoy. On sugar, for example, if these countries were offered a similar deal to the 
LDCs, ACP exports to the EU could reach 3.5 million tonnes (EC, 2003). Indeed, if 
their entire production was exported to the EU, this would represent 6 million tonnes. 
Negotiations with Mercusor could further increase this quantity (EC, 2003), although 
it is noteworthy that sugar (and beef) were excluded entirely from the EU’s 
liberalisation offer under its Free Trade Agreement with South Africa. If the EBA 
were to become the benchmark for the ACP in the EPA negotiations, it might be 




As a general conclusion, EBA has not played a significant role in the evolution of 
CAP reform apart from the two specific exceptions of sugar and rice. The overall 
volume of exports, or potential exports, from LDCs in CAP products is just too small 
to create market management difficulties for CAP-supported products. Sugar and rice 
are the two commodities where LDCs do have real supply capacity, and full  18
unrestricted access for these products will only be available from 2009. The reform of 
the EU rice and sugar regimes in 2003 and 2005, respectively, was undoubtedly 
motivated in part by the desire to make the EU market a less attractive outlet for these 
countries and thus diminish the volume of additional imports. In the case of sugar, it is 
even possible that the November 2005 reform will not have cut EU production 
sufficiently to accommodate the possible increase in EBA imports. In this situation, 
the reform makes provision for further unilateral quota cuts to ensure that the EU 
sugar market is balanced. But, apart from these products, EBA has not influenced 
CAP reform. Looking ahead, however, in the context of the EPA negotiations 
between the EU and the ACP countries under the Cotonou Agreement, EBA may yet 
play a role as a benchmark which ACP countries will use in seeking greater access to 
the EU market in return for liberalising their own markets towards EU exports. While 
it is too early to guess at the shape of a final agreement, any move to extend more 
generous preferential access to non-LDC ACP countries for CAP-supported products 
would have much greater implications for the CAP simply because of their greater 
supply capacity. 
 
Nor did the EBA prove of much assistance in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations. 
In part, this might have been because the EU’s scheme of DFQFA for LDCs is no 
longer quite as unique as it was. Nearly all developed countries now offer significant 
duty-free access to LDCs. However, the EU’s scheme does cover sensitive 
agricultural commodities such as rice and sugar, unlike those of the US and Japan. It 
is also the case that the EU remains the most important importer of agri-food products 
from the developing world.  The 2003 CAP reform has decoupled the vast bulk of 
direct payments to farmers from production. But these indicators of openness to agri-
food imports from developing countries were not enough to overcome their suspicion 
that the EU was intent on maintaining substantial support to its own farmers while 
seeking significant reductions in the protection developing countries provide to their 
industrial and service sectors. In the words of Kamal Nath, India’s Commerce 
Minister, “We have been seeing an amazing development in the discussions in Hong 
Kong whereby the developed countries talk in the plenary halls of a ‘Round for Free’ 
for developing countries. Then they move to the green room and continue to ask for a 
‘Round for Free’, this time for themselves.”
7 This reaction suggests that offering EBA 
access has done little to improve the development credentials of the CAP in the eyes 
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